{
  "version": 1,
  "event_id": "evt_06fea6fa74343a56",
  "url": "https://xiyu.news/events/evt_06fea6fa74343a56/",
  "json": "https://xiyu.news/api/events/evt_06fea6fa74343a56.json",
  "type": "security_incident",
  "status": "monitoring",
  "category": "crypto",
  "title": {
    "zh": "GalaChain 漏洞利用 74 个失败交易签名盗走约 300 万美元资产",
    "en": "Hacker turned 55 days of failed transactions into a $3 million master key that drained GalaChain wallets"
  },
  "current_state": {
    "zh": "GalaChain 在 9 月 14 日发布的事后复盘报告中披露，攻击者利用从失败交易中收集到的 74 个可重放签名（最早可追溯至 55 天前），于 8 月 18 日从九个钱包中盗走约 20 亿枚 GALA（约 300 万美元）以及数十种其他代币。攻击期间该链暂停了跨链桥，并已修补签名范围混淆漏洞和重放密钥回滚缺陷。\n\n这起攻击表明，密码学上有效的签名并不等于用户已授权某项经济活动，而分别审查签名验证、重放保护和交易执行的审计流程，可能漏掉只在系统交互时才暴露的缺陷。它同时向链运营方提出治理层面的问题：当攻击已经实现自动化时，依赖人工触发的应急控制与基于有效签名的系统是否还能足够快地响应。\n\nGalaChain 的验证器此前接受请求中自带的 EIP-712 类型定义，而不是从被调用的操作中推导类型，因此可以提交覆盖某组字段的签名，却让另一个方法带着签名者从未承诺的额外信息执行——链上一个案例显示，一笔 TransferToken 调用转移了约 16.4 亿枚 GALA，而用于验证的 EIP-712 结构描述的却是 AddLiquidity 操作。由于交易失败时唯一交易键会随之回滚，签名仍留在公开账本上而重放键依然可用；与本次漏洞相关的 60 笔历史源交易中有 57 笔包含至少一个失败的内部操作，调查人员称没有证据表明受影响用户的私钥、助记词或密码遭到泄露。",
    "en": "An attacker harvested 74 signatures from failed GalaChain transactions and used them to drain roughly 2 billion GALA (~$3 million) plus dozens of other tokens from nine wallets, exposing a gap between signature verification and replay protection that had survived multiple security reviews."
  },
  "first_seen_at": "2026-09-17T17:11:51.691706+00:00",
  "last_updated_at": "2026-09-17T17:11:51.691706+00:00",
  "last_material_change_at": "2026-09-17T17:11:51.691706+00:00",
  "confidence": 0.75,
  "updates_count": 1,
  "sources_count": 1,
  "entities": [
    "gala",
    "galachain",
    "hacker"
  ],
  "identifiers": [],
  "topics": [
    "gala",
    "signature-replay"
  ],
  "updates": [
    {
      "update_id": "upd_3f715ed98b7c3448",
      "event_id": "evt_06fea6fa74343a56",
      "occurred_at": "2026-09-17T11:30:07Z",
      "published_at": "2026-09-17T11:30:07Z",
      "first_seen_at": "2026-09-17T17:11:51.691706Z",
      "time_precision": "published",
      "update_type": "initial",
      "material_change": true,
      "title_zh": "GalaChain 漏洞利用 74 个失败交易签名盗走约 300 万美元资产",
      "title_en": "Hacker turned 55 days of failed transactions into a $3 million master key that drained GalaChain wallets",
      "what_changed_zh": "GalaChain 在 9 月 14 日发布的事后复盘报告中披露，攻击者利用从失败交易中收集到的 74 个可重放签名（最早可追溯至 55 天前），于 8 月 18 日从九个钱包中盗走约 20 亿枚 GALA（约 300 万美元）以及数十种其他代币。攻击期间该链暂停了跨链桥，并已修补签名范围混淆漏洞和重放密钥回滚缺陷。\n\n这起攻击表明，密码学上有效的签名并不等于用户已授权某项经济活动，而分别审查签名验证、重放保护和交易执行的审计流程，可能漏掉只在系统交互时才暴露的缺陷。它同时向链运营方提出治理层面的问题：当攻击已经实现自动化时，依赖人工触发的应急控制与基于有效签名的系统是否还能足够快地响应。\n\nGalaChain 的验证器此前接受请求中自带的 EIP-712 类型定义，而不是从被调用的操作中推导类型，因此可以提交覆盖某组字段的签名，却让另一个方法带着签名者从未承诺的额外信息执行——链上一个案例显示，一笔 TransferToken 调用转移了约 16.4 亿枚 GALA，而用于验证的 EIP-712 结构描述的却是 AddLiquidity 操作。由于交易失败时唯一交易键会随之回滚，签名仍留在公开账本上而重放键依然可用；与本次漏洞相关的 60 笔历史源交易中有 57 笔包含至少一个失败的内部操作，调查人员称没有证据表明受影响用户的私钥、助记词或密码遭到泄露。",
      "what_changed_en": "An attacker harvested 74 signatures from failed GalaChain transactions and used them to drain roughly 2 billion GALA (~$3 million) plus dozens of other tokens from nine wallets, exposing a gap between signature verification and replay protection that had survived multiple security reviews.",
      "current_state_zh": "GalaChain 在 9 月 14 日发布的事后复盘报告中披露，攻击者利用从失败交易中收集到的 74 个可重放签名（最早可追溯至 55 天前），于 8 月 18 日从九个钱包中盗走约 20 亿枚 GALA（约 300 万美元）以及数十种其他代币。攻击期间该链暂停了跨链桥，并已修补签名范围混淆漏洞和重放密钥回滚缺陷。\n\n这起攻击表明，密码学上有效的签名并不等于用户已授权某项经济活动，而分别审查签名验证、重放保护和交易执行的审计流程，可能漏掉只在系统交互时才暴露的缺陷。它同时向链运营方提出治理层面的问题：当攻击已经实现自动化时，依赖人工触发的应急控制与基于有效签名的系统是否还能足够快地响应。\n\nGalaChain 的验证器此前接受请求中自带的 EIP-712 类型定义，而不是从被调用的操作中推导类型，因此可以提交覆盖某组字段的签名，却让另一个方法带着签名者从未承诺的额外信息执行——链上一个案例显示，一笔 TransferToken 调用转移了约 16.4 亿枚 GALA，而用于验证的 EIP-712 结构描述的却是 AddLiquidity 操作。由于交易失败时唯一交易键会随之回滚，签名仍留在公开账本上而重放键依然可用；与本次漏洞相关的 60 笔历史源交易中有 57 笔包含至少一个失败的内部操作，调查人员称没有证据表明受影响用户的私钥、助记词或密码遭到泄露。",
      "current_state_en": "An attacker harvested 74 signatures from failed GalaChain transactions and used them to drain roughly 2 billion GALA (~$3 million) plus dozens of other tokens from nine wallets, exposing a gap between signature verification and replay protection that had survived multiple security reviews.",
      "detailed_summary_zh": "An attacker harvested 74 signatures from failed GalaChain transactions and used them to drain roughly 2 billion GALA (~$3 million) plus dozens of other tokens from nine wallets, exposing a gap between signature verification and replay protection that had survived multiple security reviews.",
      "detailed_summary_en": "An attacker harvested 74 signatures from failed GalaChain transactions and used them to drain roughly 2 billion GALA (~$3 million) plus dozens of other tokens from nine wallets, exposing a gap between signature verification and replay protection that had survived multiple security reviews.",
      "background_zh": "GalaChain 是由 Gala Games 开发的区块链，GALA 是其游戏与娱乐生态中使用的代币。EIP-712 是一项以太坊签名标准，用于对结构化、可读的数据进行签名，钱包会在用户批准操作前展示这些内容。签名重放攻击指攻击者重新提交此前已获批准的签名，使系统再次执行同一授权——2022 年 Wintermute 约 2000 万枚 OP 代币被盗事件正是此类手法。本次事件中的重放并非来自伪造签名或窃取密钥，而是来自失败交易已经公开在链上的真实签名。",
      "background_en": "GalaChain is the blockchain developed by Gala Games, and GALA is the token used across its gaming and entertainment ecosystem. EIP-712 is an Ethereum standard for signing structured, human-readable data, which wallets display to users before they approve an action. A signature replay attack occurs when an attacker resubmits a previously approved signature so the system executes the same authorization again — the pattern behind the 2022 theft of roughly 20 million OP tokens from Wintermute. Here the reuse came not from forging signatures or stealing keys, but from authentic signatures that had already been published on-chain by failed transactions.",
      "community_discussion_zh": "",
      "community_discussion_en": "",
      "market_impact_zh": "直接风险敞口集中在 GALA 及 GalaChain 上发行的其他代币，其持有者和链上流动性池承受了被抽走的余额，而跨链桥暂停则暂时切断了 GalaChain 与其他网络之间转移价值的主要通道。除 GALA 本身外，该披露还会影响交易所、跨链桥运营方和其他 L1 团队对其自身代码中签名验证与重放保护风险的定价，复盘讨论也指向更多控制措施前移到结算前检查，而这会在速率限制、提现延迟和运营方自由裁量权方面带来新的权衡。",
      "market_impact_en": "The direct exposure is concentrated in GALA and other tokens issued on GalaChain, whose holders and on-chain liquidity pools absorbed the drained balances, while the bridge pause temporarily cut the main path moving value between GalaChain and other networks. Beyond GALA itself, the disclosure feeds into how exchanges, bridge operators, and other L1 teams price signature-verification and replay-protection risk in their own code, and postmortem commentary points to a shift toward pre-settlement checks that carry tradeoffs in rate limits, withdrawal delays, and operator discretion.",
      "importance_score": 7.5,
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://news.gala.com/gala/galachain-security-incident-18-august-2026/",
          "title": "GalaChain Security Incident - 18 August 2026 | Gala News"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://cryptoslate.com/hacker-turned-55-days-of-failed-transactions-into-a-3-million-master-key-that-drained-galachain-wallets/",
          "title": "GalaChain’s 2 billion GALA exploit began with failed transactions"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/galachain-hacker-exploited-failed-transactions-to-steal-3m-in-55-days",
          "title": "GalaChain Hacker Exploited Failed Transactions to Steal... | KuCoin"
        }
      ],
      "confidence": 0.75,
      "story_ids": [
        "rss:cryptoslate.com_feed_:cf526503e8e4add0"
      ],
      "sources": [
        {
          "url": "https://cryptoslate.com/hacker-turned-55-days-of-failed-transactions-into-a-3-million-master-key-that-drained-galachain-wallets/",
          "label": "CryptoSlate",
          "source_type": "rss",
          "official": false
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}